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I Introduction
Gregory Van Hoey performs an admirable service in shedding light on a
neglected element of the federal securities regulation enforcement regime.' He
convincingly shows how "causing" liability can provide a viable mechanism
for reaching parties who are only secondarily responsible for a securities law
violation.2 Van Hoey's analysis is especially important in light of the United
States Supreme Court's elimination in 1994 of private actions for aiding and
abetting securities fraud.3 This Comment explores some of the possibilities of
causing liability with reference to the Enron disaster. Consideration of the
principal "gatekeepers"' failures graphically illustrates the importance of this
form of secondary liability.
At the heart of the Enron scandal was a group of exceptionally ambitious
executives seeking to create a new kind of energy company.4 At its peak,
Enron reported annual revenues of $100 billion and employed over 20,000
employees.' Fortune ranked the company as high as seventh on its "Fortune
500" list.6 We now know, however, that this edifice was an intricate house of
cards built on a foundation of sham transactions and accounting manipulations.
When the frauds surfaced during the fall of 2001, the structure quickly col-
lapsed, leaving investors, employees, and customers with billions of dollars in
losses. How could a company that was the poster child for innovation and
entrepreneurial success fall so far so fast? How could so many people have
been deceived?
It turns out that Enron was not unique. Since its fall, revelations of
accounting impropriety and insider corruption at WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia,
1. Gregory Van Hoey, Note, Liabilityfor "Causing" Violations of the Federal Securities
Laws: Defining the SEC' Next Counterattack in the Battle of Central Bank, 60 WAsH. & LEE
L. REV. 249 (2003).
2. Id. at 284-87. Congress established causing liability in 1990, adding identical
provisions to four major federal securities regulation statutes. The amendments authorize the
SEC to apply sanctions to primary violators and to "any other person that is, was, or would be
a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known would
contribute to such violation." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(a), 78u-3(a), 80a-9(f)(1), 80b-3(k)(1) (2000).
3. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191
(1994) (holding that neither antifraud statute nor legislative scheme authorizes private actions
for aiding and abetting).
4. For an insightful analysis of Enron's rise and fall and the scandal's law reform
implications, see generally William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value,
76 TUL. L. REv. 1275 (2002).
5. Kurt Eichenwald, Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al.
6. Gretchen Morgenson, How 287 Turned Into 7: Lessons in Fuzzy Math, N.Y. TibEs,
Jan. 20, 2002, at C1.
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and other companies continue to come to light. Major corporations are
issuing earnings restatements at a higher rate than ever before, including 270
in 2001 alone.7
Enron and other recent scandals reveal astonishing-perhaps unprece-
dented-levels of executive greed and dishonesty, but there is more to the
story than that. Certain features of the current business and legal environment
encourage management to raise share prices by any available means. Execu-
tive compensation practices heavily rely on stock options, giving top manage-
ment a direct and immediate stake in price increases. In addition, the still real
threat of hostile takeovers creates a powerful incentive on the part of corpo-
rate management to boost stock prices in order to placate investors and
discourage potential hostile bidders by raising acquisition costs. This culture
of shareholder value maximization-currently interpreted to require short-
term share price maximization-rewards efforts to boost share price whether
or not the means are lawful. How corporate law might address this problem
is certainly a question of great urgency.9
Meanwhile, another story warrants our attention. It is the utter failure of
various professional "gatekeepers" to prevent Enron from deceiving investors
and other corporate stakeholders."0 Enron's auditor, the securities analysts
who followed its fortunes, and the rating agencies that graded its creditworthi-
ness all failed to discover and reveal the chicanery. Some were more directly
involved than others in facilitating the subterfuge, but all failed in different
ways to perform their watchdog responsibilities. In this sense, these gatekeep-
ers share the blame for the Enron debacle.
7. This number compares to only three restatements in 1981 and an average of only
forty-nine annually from 1990 to 1997. There were 91 in 1998, 150 in 1999, and 156 in 2000.
John C. Coffee Jr., UnderstandingEnron: "It'sAbout the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW.
1403, 1407 (2002); see also Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Depreciated: Did You Hear the One About
the Accountant? It's Not Very Funny, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, at Al (describing how,
during 1990s, many auditors came under intense pressure to produce "rosy" results for share-
holders, turning many into "lapdogs" of their clients).
8. See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY (2001)
(illuminating and criticizing "ethic of stock price maximization").
9. For some preliminary skepticism regarding the ability of law reform to correct deeper
cultural norms in this area, see David Millon, Why is Corporate Management Obsessed with
QuarterlyEarnings and WhatShouldBe Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming
2003).
10. For an analysis of the role of gatekeepers in the Enron disaster, see STAFF TO THE
SENATE COMM. ONGOVERNMENTALAFFAIRS, 107THCONG.,FINANCIALOVERSIGHTOFENRON:
THE SEC AND PRiVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 26-28, 69-125 (Oct. 8, 2002), available at
http//www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/100702watchdogsreport.pdf [hereinafter SENATE COMM.
STAFF REPORT]. See generally Coffee, supra note 7.
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In order to assign responsibility for what happened and to prevent future
Enrons, it is not enough to identify and punish the primary violators, including
Skilling, Fastow, Kopper, and others. It is also necessary to deal with the
gatekeepers' failures to perform their public functions. Until this is done, we
cannot expect a restoration of public confidence in our equity markets. This
is where secondary liability may have an important role to play. This Com-
ment therefore explores the potential of "causing" liability, analyzed in Van
Hoey's excellent Note, as it might apply to the gatekeepers in the Enron case.
II. Gatekeepers
A. The Gatekeeper's Function
According to Professor Coffee, "the professional gatekeeper essentially
assesses or vouches for the corporate client's own statements about itself or
a specific transaction."'" Gatekeepers are necessary because a corporation's
assertions about itself often are inherently suspect. In various contexts, a
corporation-and those in control of it-stand to gain if investors, lenders,
employees, and others believe its favorable pronouncements about its own
financial condition and prospects. There can be a built-in incentive to lie.
Gatekeepers, therefore, are meant to serve as independent watchdogs. Their
role is to subject corporate statements to disinterested scrutiny and then to
certify their accuracy. 2
As a structural matter, gatekeepers are more trustworthy than the corpora-
tions they monitor because they do not face the same conflicts of interest.
Because gatekeepers are supposed to be independent, they should not stand
to benefit if the public credits a company's pronouncements. Outsiders
therefore should be more willing to rely on the information in question.
Furthermore, a gatekeeper puts its own reputational capital on the line
each time it vouches for a corporation's self-assessment. 3 If its endorsement
turns out to be unfounded, the gatekeeper forfeits some of that capital. That
risk is important because the value of a gatekeeper's endorsement depends on
11. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1405.
12. See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 916, 966
(1998) (discussing gatekeepers in terms of their role as market checks on corporate power);
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53-61 (1986) (discussing effects of placing liability on third party
enforcers of corporate transparency).
13. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1405 (noting that gatekeepers pledge their reputational
capital when they vouch for clients' statements or transactions).
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its reputation for trustworthiness." 4 If it violates that trust, it cannot credibly
perform its function. The gatekeeper then loses its reason for being.
B. Who Are the Gatekeepers?
Most prominently, gatekeepers include the public auditing firms that
opine on the propriety of corporate financial reporting with reference to the
accounting profession's own Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 5
The auditor reviews a corporation's internally generated financial statements
and tests their accuracy by examining a sample of the transactions in which
the corporation engaged during the period of time under review. The auditor
also analyzes the adequacy of the corporation's internal system of financial
controls. Sometimes it assists in the planning of complex financial transac-
tions in light of accounting and tax considerations. Indirectly at least, this
participation can be taken as an endorsement of the legitimacy of those
transactions.
"Sell-side" securities analysts work for firms that provide brokerage
services to clients.' 6 An analyst collects and digests information about the
companies that he or she follows. The analyst relies on SEC filings and also
may participate in regular conference calls with corporate management and
may attend presentations in person. Based on this information and on special-
ized knowledge about the industry in which a particular company operates, the
analyst publishes periodic reports containing assessments of the company's
prospects and notices of its possible problems. The reports may include future
earnings estimates. Typically available only to brokerage clients, the reports
ordinarily include recommendations to buy, sell, or hold a particular stock.
For these clients, the analyst provides a service that would be too costly for
investors to undertake on their own. Clients therefore rely on analysts to
provide research to which they otherwise would not have access.
Credit rating agencies evaluate and grade the creditworthiness of corpo-
rate borrowers. Each uses a scale including several investment grade ratings
and also several non-investment (or "junk") ratings. The SEC has conferred
quasi-public status upon three credit rating agencies-Moody's, Standard &
Poor's, and Fitch-recognizing them as "Nationally Recognized Statistical
14. See id. (theorizing that the public views gatekeepers as trustworthy because they sense
that gatekeepers will not sacrifice reputation for the benefit of one client).
15. See generally TEDJ. FIFUS,ACCOUNTINGISSUESFORLAWYERS 106-17 (4th ed. 1991)
(describing Generally Accepted Accounting Principles).
16. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'NANALYZINGANALYST RECOMMENDA-
TIONS, at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm (last modified June 20, 2002) (describ-
ing work of research analysts).
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Ratings Organizations" (NRSROs)."7 Today, numerous federal and state
regulations rely on NRSRO investment grade ratings as benchmarks serving
a range of functions." Issuers of publicly held debt securities also widely use
the ratings to define conditions of default. Because these agencies rely on
information provided by the borrowers themselves, their role is to evaluate
corporations' own self-evaluations for the benefit of investors in debt securi-
ties.
In different ways, all of these institutions help members of the public to
assess and rely on corporations' own presentations of their current financial
condition and future prospects. Each gatekeeper's reputation for independence
and expertise is the basis for the public's reliance on its evaluative judgments.
Because it is not cost-effective for individuals to perform these tasks for
themselves, gatekeepers significantly contribute to the efficiency of capital and
other markets.
Parenthetically, it can also be noted that investment banks and elite law
firms also serve a gatekeeper function. When they advise a corporation on a
complex transaction, their involvement can, indirectly at least, lend an impor-
tant imprimatur as to its legality and also as to its financial soundness, matters
that typically are too expensive for investors to evaluate on their own. How-
ever, investment bankers and lawyers differ from auditing firms, stock ana-
lysts, and credit rating agencies because their primary constituencies are the
companies they serve rather than the general public. Any certification function
they might perform for the benefit of the public is secondary to their client-
centered focus. Although this difference, more so as to lawyers than bankers,
may be one of degree, this Comment focuses on those actors whose primary
purpose is public certification. 9
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2002).
18. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down
for the Credit RatingAgencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 692 (1999) (commenting that "the web
of regulation" now creating demand for NRSRO ratings "is so thick that a thorough review
would occupy hundreds, perhaps thousands of pages").
19. The SEC itself also plays an important gatekeeper role. It has been criticized for its
failure to prevent Enron and the other recent scandals, although it is generally agreed that the
SEC has been under-staffed and under-funded for a number of years. See SENATE COMM. STAFF
REPORT, supra note 10, at 8-16 (discussing the role of the SEC in combating financial fraud
and noting reasons why it could not prevent the Enron scandal). Because this Comment
considers gatekeepers with reference to potential causing liability, it does not consider the
SEC's gatekeeper role. The financial press can also be seen as providing an important gate-
keeper function. Like the others, it too was largely unsuccessful. See Scott Sherman, Gimme
an 'E' Enron: Uncovering the Uncovered Story, COLUM. JOURNALMSM REV. (March/April
2002) (discussing major financial publications that celebrated Enron's success), available at
http:/www.cjr.org/year/02/2/ sherman.asp.
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C. Gatekeepers' Conflicts of Interest
The model of the gatekeeper's function sketched above includes a nagging
complication. In theory, those who rely on gatekeepers' pronouncements
ought to pay for their services. That would give gatekeepers the incentive to
perform in a manner that justifies reliance. Gatekeepers who earned a reputa-
tion for unreliability would not survive. In fact, however, no such market
exists.2"
Instead, it turns out that the person who pays the gatekeeper typically is
the corporation whose credibility is already uncertain. Corporations pay their
auditors and the credit rating agencies directly. Certainly this arrangement
presents the possibility that these gatekeepers will be less than entirely vigilant
if doing so threatens the security of these fee-generating relationships.
Although corporations do not directly compensate the analysts who follow
and report on their stock, they can reward them for favorable recommendations
by funneling highly lucrative investment banking business to the firms that
employ them. Analysts may benefit in the form of increased compensation if
they are able to help the firm land valuable investment banking work. The
linkage between securities research and investment banking is a matter of much
current controversy. 21
Gatekeepers depend on harmonious client relations for their livelihood.
The implications for gatekeeper independence are obvious and call into ques-
tion the reliability of their endorsements. The standard model responds to this
concern by assuming that the fees to be earned from a single client would never
be high enough to justify the huge reputational costs that would flow from the
revelation of a gatekeeper's compromised independence.22 The Enron scandal
suggests that this assumption may no longer be warranted. Before turning to
a survey of how each of the gatekeepers failed to perform its function in the
Enron case, we can first consider the two unexposed frauds that were the
immediate causes of Enron's collapse.
20. This fact could be taken to indicate that gatekeepers' services are not in fact as
valuable as they have been assumed to be, but factors besides lack of demand can also explain
the market failure. This question is better left for another day.
21. See Charles Gasparino et al., Regulators to Team Up to Build Plan for Analyst
Abuses, IPOs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2002, at C4 (announcing common plan between securities
regulators and Wall Street firms to combat abuses involving analysts' conflicts of interest); Jeff
D. Opdyke, StockAdvice You Can Trust?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31,2002, at D1 (reporting reforms
to remove incentives for analysts to "help drum up investment-banking business for their
employers"); Randall Smith, Regulators Set Accord with Securities Firms, But Some Issues Still
Persist, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at C1 (discussing $1.4 billion settlement between New
York Attorney General, the SEC, and investment banking firms to remedy abuses related to
stock research).
22. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1405 (noting conventional logic that gatekeepers would
not sacrifice reputation for the benefit of single client or fee).
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I1. Enron 's Collapse
A. The SPEs
It is becoming increasingly evident that Enron was involved in a broad
range of illegal, or at least suspect, financial maneuvers in order to enhance its
financial reporting. These included manipulation of the California electric
energy market23 and questionable dealings in the market for broadband network
capacity.24 The company probably engaged in more illegal activities yet to be
found.
Many of the problematic transactions involved Enron's use of so-called
"special purpose entities" (SPEs). Corporations often create SPEs for a range
of legitimate business objectives, including securitization of income-generat-
ing assets like accounts receivable or leases.25 Enron, however, created hun-
dreds of SPEs to achieve a range of more questionable objectives. These
included increasing earnings and revenue through apparent sales of assets by
Enron to SPEs in which there were, in fact, no genuine transfers of risk. Enron
also entered into prepaid commodities trades that were actually disguised
loans. It kept debt off its balance sheet by borrowing through SPEs. This was
especially important for funding projects requiring heavy capital investment.
Shifting these liabilities to SPEs helped Enron preserve its investment-grade
credit rating.
The value of these kinds of transactions to Enron depended on treating the
SPEs for accounting purposes as if they were separate, independent entities.
However, if a corporation is to enjoy the benefit of separate accounting treat-
ment for a SPE, accounting rules require that at least three percent of the SPE's
total capital consist of equity provided by an independent outsider.26 This
investor must also exercise control over the SPEY Failure to satisfy these
conditions prevents recognition of transactions between the corporation and its
23. See Joseph Kahn, Californians Call Enron Documents the SmokingGun,N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 2002, at Al (reporting federal regulators' release of Enron memoranda showing that
Enron manipulated California's power market).
24. See Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Prosecutors Probe Skilling's Role in
Enron's Failed Telecom Venture, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2002, at Al (reporting the focus of
federal prosecutors on the role of Skilling and other Enron executives in a failed broadband
venture).
25. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron, and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities
in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2002) (discussing securitization and
distinguishing Enron's use of SPEs).
26. WIAMC. POWERS JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGAnON BY THE SPECIAL INVESTI-
GATIVE COlIMITrE OFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORS OFENRONCORP. 5 (2002), available at2002
WL 198018 [hereinafter POWERS REPORT].
27. Id.
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SPE and also requires that the corporation consolidate the SPE's financial
results into its own financial statements."
According to the Powers Report, the basic problem with Enron's dealings
with its SPEs was that the transactions lacked genuine economic substance and
instead "apparently were designed to accomplish favorable financial statement
results, not to achieve bona fide economic objectives or transfer risk."29
However, the immediate causes of Enron's collapse-and the primary focus
of the Powers Report-were the revelations of two sets of faulty transactions.
One involved Enron's failure to meet the three percent equity requirement for
some of its SPEs. The other was the result of a number of failed hedging
contracts. The public disclosure of these problems led directly to the final
collapse of Enron's share price and its bankruptcy filing on December 2, 2001.
Although much more might be said about the full range of Enron's financial
improprieties once they all come to light, these transactions provide a useful
framework for assessing the gatekeepers' failures in this case.
B. The Phantom Hedges
On October 16, 2001, Enron announced a $544 million after-tax charge
against earnings and a $1.2 billion reduction in shareholders' equity. The
immediate result was a sharp plunge in Enron's stock price, which had recently
rallied after months of gradual decline.
Enron had entered into a series of "hedging" contracts with several
SPEs.30 These transactions were supposed to protect Enron from the downside
risk associated with its investments in the stock of other companies, its so-
called merchant equity portfolio.31 The basic idea was that Enron bought put
options from its SPEs, allowing it to cause the SPEs to buy these shares if they
fell below a certain value.
When it set up these SPEs, Enron funded them with its own common
stock.32 Because the hedging contracts allowed Enron to avoid reflecting
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4.
30. See id. at 79-82, 100-04, 115-18 (detailing actions of Enron's SPEs, including
entities called LJM1, Raptor II, 111, and IV, and several other specially created SPEs).
31. Id. at 13. This portfolio included holdings in Rhythms NetConnections, Inc. worth
approximately $300 million as of May 1999, as well as shares in several other companies. Id.
at 77.
32. Id. at 13. Enron apparently capitalized one of the SPEs, Raptor Il, with stock of a
company (called New Power Holdings, Inc.) in which Enron had a substantial investment. Id.
at 114. Enron then entered into a hedging transaction with Raptor III to protect itself against
loss on that investment. Id. Obviously, a decline in value of Enron's investment also meant a
corresponding decline in the SPE's ability to perform its hedging obligation. Needless to say,
the Powers Report's characterization of this transaction as an "extraordinarily fragile structure"
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declines in value of its merchant investments on its income statements, Enron's
management saw these transactions as a way to cash in on the dramatic rise in
the market value of Enron's stock."3 However, when the value of Enron's
shares fell, the financial ability of the SPEs to perform their hedging obliga-
tions fell along with it. When the value of the merchant investment portfolio
also fell, the SPEs were unable to honor their commitments to Enron. Even
after Enron contributed additional shares of its stock, the SPEs still lacked
sufficient capital. Once the hedges failed, Enron finally had to recognize the
losses on the merchant investments as a charge against earnings on its income
statement and a reduction in shareholders' equity on its balance sheet.
The basic flaw in this arrangement was that Enron funded the parties to
the hedges itself and did so with its own stock. Compared to a typical hedging
contract, in which there is full transfer of risk to an independent, financially
self-sufficient third party, Enron itself had provided the capital that it would
receive back from the SPEs under the contracts. Moreover, the SPEs' ability
to shield Enron from risk was further compromised by the fact that the capital
Enron provided took the form of Enron's own stock. This meant that the SPEs'
ability to perform their hedging obligations depended entirely on the stability
of Enron's share price. "In effect," the Powers Report concludes, "Enron was
hedging risk with itself."34
C. The Non-Independent SPE
Only three weeks later, on November 8, 2001, Enron restated its financial
statements for the period 1997 through 2000:
Year Net Income Shareholders' Debt (increase)
(reduction) Equity (reduction)
1997 $28 million $258 million $711 million
1998 $133 $391 $561
1999 $248 $710 $685
2000 $99 $754 $628
is a remarkable understatement. Id.
33. Ordinarily, "mark to market" accounting principles require a corporation to reflect
gains and losses on merchant investments on its income statements. Hedging contracts can
protect a corporation from recognizing declines in value. For Enron, its reliance on hedging
transactions with the four Raptor SPEs shielded it from almost $1 billion in losses over a period
of slightly more than one year. Id. at 132.
34. Id. at 97.
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The problem here was the revelation that one of Enron's SPEs did not
meet the three percent outside equity non-consolidation requirement. This
SPE, called Chewco, was formed hastily in November 1997 in order to facili-
tate a transaction between Enron and the California Public Employees' Retire-
ment System." At the time of formation, Chewco was capitalized almost
entirely by debt.36 Enron's plan was to find an outside equity investor by the
end of the year in order to achieve non-consolidation. It made an effort to
characterize a contribution from Barclays Bank as equity, but Chewco's
repayment obligation was partially collateralized. That part of the Barclays
investment therefore was not at risk and, accordingly, could not be counted
toward the three-percent requirement.3" Enron never found a third party to
contribute the necessary outside equity.39
Despite failing to comply with the three-percent requirement, Enron
accounted for Chewco as if it were an independent, unconsolidated SPE from
1997 until 2001.40 Once this failure came to light, Enron and Arthur Andersen
concluded in November 2001 that Enron should consolidate Chewco retroac-
tively, resulting in the restatements printed above. These disclosures led to a




Arthur Andersen's audits of Enron's financial statements during each of
the years discussed above resulted in unqualified reports. In other words,
Andersen expressed its opinion that Enron's financial statements fairly pre-
sented, in all material respects, Enron's financial position in accordance with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.41 In the wake of the disclosures
that led to Enron's downfall, it is clear that these endorsements were serious
errors.
35. Id. at 6-7.
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id. at 49-50.
38. Id. at 52.
39. A further problem with Chewco's status was the fact that, when formed, an Enron
employee (Kopper) was Chewco's sole manager. Id. at 47-48. Later changes in Chewco's
structure were supposed to limit Enron's control. The Powers Report concludes that whether
these changes were sufficient to satisfy that element of the non-consolidation requirements "is
not free from doubt." Id. at 49.
40. Id. at 42.
41. For discussion of audit reports generally, see LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUC-
TORY ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE FOR LAWYERS 12-15 (2d ed. 1999).
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Those who have studied the matter closely believe that Andersen's audit
activities should not have resulted in unqualified reports. As Enron's auditor,
Andersen was in a position to alert Enron's board and the investing public of
the company's misleading financial statement disclosures. The Powers Report
concludes that Andersen "did not fulfill its professional responsibilities in
connection with its audits of Enron's financial statements, or its obligation to
bring to the attention of Enron's Board (or the Audit and Compliance Commit-
tee) concerns about Enron's internal controls over related-party transactions."4"
According to Professor Bratton, Andersen "manifestly should have refused to
give a favorable opinion on Enron's financials."43 A Staff Report prepared for
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs put the matter more bluntly:
"Andersen appears to have failed miserably in its responsibility as Enron's
auditor.
' 4
Andersen's wrongdoing was not limited to its failure to perform its audit
function. The firm was actively involved in the structuring and accounting
treatment of the transactions described above. It also assisted Enron in the
formulation of its public disclosures. Enron paid Andersen millions of dollars
for these services. In its role as auditor, Andersen therefore undertook to
review the propriety of its own work in these areas.
Why was a firm of Andersen's standing and reputation willing to assist
Enron in its financial shell games and, more generally, to turn a blind eye
toward accounting improprieties? It appears that conflicts of interest simply
overwhelmed prudential considerations. Millions of dollars were at
stake-not only audit fees but also consulting revenues. 4' And, Andersen had
to consider its accounts with other clients. How would they react if they
perceived Andersen as excessively nitpicky in its dealings with a widely
respected company like Enron?
At the individual level, strong incentives exist for audit partners to be as
cooperative as possible. Both David Duncan, the Andersen partner who was
in charge of the Enron account, and his staff had actually moved into the Enron
building and were serving as internal, as well as outside, auditors. Enron was
42. PoWERS REPORT, supra note 26, at 24.
43. Bratton, supra note 4, at 1287; see also id. at 1341 (referring to "the egregious nature
of the audit breakdown").
44. SENATE COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 27.
45. According to one survey, the typical public corporation now pays its auditor three
times as much in consulting fees as it does in audit fees. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1410-11
(citing Janet Kidd Stewart & Andrew Countryman, LocalAudit Conflicts Add Up: Consulting
Deals, Hiring Practices in Question, C-1. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2002, at CI (reporting the results of
a survey measuring the independence of auditors)). Accounting firms may offer their audit
services at or even below cost in order to establish a relationship that can generate much more
substantial consulting fees. Id.
320
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Duncan's only client. If he lost that client, he might have found himself
without a job.
Andersen's willingness to risk its reputation in the service of Enron was
not just a matter of financial gain. On the cost side of the ledger, the huge
increase in earnings restatements during the 1990s may have reduced the
reputational cost of publicly disclosed error. If restatements have become
"part of doing business" for all the Big Five (now Four, since Andersen's own
collapse), perhaps the relative reputational cost of a single error declines.
Firms therefore may find themselves more willing to engage in behavior that
they previously would have considered too risky.
B. The Analysts
Despite the steady decline in Enron's share price during 2001, analysts
following the company continued to be optimistic about its prospects. Even
after Enron announced on October 16th the $544 million charge against
earnings and $1.2 billion reduction in shareholders' equity, all fifteen of the
analysts employed by the largest investment banking firms rated Enron as a
"strong buy" or "buy."46 Ten analysts maintained their ratings after the No-
vember 8th earnings restatement, by which time Enron's share price had fallen
to $8.41 from $84.00 at the beginning of the year.47 When Enron filed for
bankruptcy protection on December 2nd, only two analysts recommended sale
of its shares. Seven rated it as a "hold" and one still listed it as a "buy.
'
"4
Richard Gross of Lehman Brothers exemplified the analysts' apparent
blind faith in Enron despite mounting evidence to the contrary.49 On October
16th he said: "The end of the world is not at hand .... We think investors
should rustle up some courage and aggressively buy the stock."5 Gross
reiterated his "strong buy" rating in a report dated October 24th, despite
acknowledging Enron's liquidity problems, and stuck to that opinion until he
discontinued coverage of Enron on December 7th.5"
46. SENATE COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 72.
47. See id. at 72-73 (reporting that, even when facing reports of impending SEC investi-
gation, lower stock price, and November 8th earnings restatement, ten analysts "did not budge
from their buy or strong buy ratings on Enron's stock").
48. Id. at 73.
49. For discussion of other examples of overly optimistic analysts, see id. at 74-76.
50. Ben White, Analysts Faulted for Forecasts, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2002, at El
(quoting Richard Gross).
51. SENATE COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 73-74. Gross's involvement in
Lehman Brothers's work on the proposed merger between Enron and Dynegy apparently
disabled him temporarily from speaking publicly about Enron, id. at 74 n.260, but that deal was
called off on November 28th. Id. at 73.
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The Enron analysts' unrealistic optimism may have been a symptom of
a larger phenomenon. Recently at least, analysts working for major Wall
Street firms have been strikingly unwilling to publish negative ratings. One
study concluded that, during 2001, less than two percent of all sell-side ana-
lysts' recommendations were "sell." 2 According to another study, from late
1999 through most of 2000 analysts issued over 28,000 ratings, but advised
investors to sell less than one percent of the time.53
Analysts' unwillingness to speak negatively appears to be connected to
a significant structural conflict of interest.54 The firms that employ them have
a strong interest in attracting and retaining highly lucrative investment bank-
ing business. What the analysts say about a company can affect its decisions
about whom to consult for assistance with a securities offering or acquisition.
The banks dare not jeopardize these opportunities by employing naysayers
who can bring down a company's stock price with a single negative report.
For example, in 1998 Enron apparently pressured investment bankers at
Merrill Lynch to secure a better rating from the firm's analyst." Enron, which
generated a lot of investment banking business,56 threatened to send it else-
where. Soon after, the analyst responsible for following Enron left Merrill
Lynch, and the firm replaced him with another analyst who promptly up-
graded Enron's rating to a "buy."57
Pressure from the investment bankers may explain why analysts em-
ployed by firms with significant banking operations appear to be systemati-
cally more optimistic than independent research firms. In contrast to sell-side
analysts, six of eight independent analysts who reported on Enron recom-
mended sale prior to November 2001, three as early as March or April.5" A
52. Id. at 81 (describing the testimony of Charles Hill, Director of Research at Thompson
Financial/First Call, which explained that two-thirds of recommendations in 2001 were "buys,"
one-third were "holds," and less than 2% were "sells").
53. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1408 n.24 (citing Thomson Financial/First Call study).
54. See SENATE COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 82-84 (recognizing the conflict
between analysts' interest in producing accurate recommendations and their interest in retaining
business for their employers).
55. See id. at 83 (reporting that "a memorandum from investment bankers at Merrill
Lynch to its President indicated that Enron was pressuring Merrill Lynch to improve its rating
in 1998, by threatening to withhold investment banking business").
56. Enron apparently made approximately thirty securities offerings in 2000 and 2001.
Id. at 82 n.310.
57. Id. at 83. Even aside from investment banking considerations, analysts may also feel
pressure directly from the companies in the form of an implicit threat not to share information
if the analyst is "uncooperative." See id. at 88-89 (stating that a company displeased with a
particular analyst's coverage may "blackball" that analyst).
58. Id. at 76-77.
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research firm called Off Wall Street Consulting Group suggested in May that
Enron was worth less than half of its $60 per share market price. 9 Relying on
public information also fully available to the sell-side analysts, this firm
pointed to Enron's declining profit margins, low return on capital, and heavy
reliance on related-party transactions.'"
Sell-side analysts' unwillingness to be skeptical about Enron may also be
an instance of the "herd behavior" phenomenon. 61 According to one model,
the reputational costs of being wrong are lower if the actor's decision is
consistent with those of others than if he or she stakes out a unique position. 2
For example, if a fund manager makes an investment decision that proves to
be a loser, he or she is less likely to be criticized if others made the same
mistake than if the manager had acted in a contrarian manner.63 Perhaps
individual analysts had doubts about Enron but were reluctant to deviate from
the pack. Better to be wrong together than to risk being wrong alone.
C. The Credit Rating Agencies
The three credit rating agencies all maintained investment grade ratings
on Enron's debt until November 28,2001, just four days before the bankruptcy
filing on December 2nd.? Even these decisions seem to have been made
reluctantly. In late October and early November, the announcement of the
massive charges against earnings and shareholders' equity, disclosure of an
investigation by the SEC, and Fastow's resignation led each of the agencies to
reassess its ratings, but each still maintained investment grade. The Staff of the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs concluded that "the agencies did
not perform a thorough analysis of Enron's public filings; did not pay appropri-
ate attention to allegations of financial fraud; and repeatedly took company
officials at their word, without asking probing questions-despite indications
that the company had misled the rating agencies in the past."'
59. Id. at 77.
60. See id. at 93 (detailing Off Wall Street's concerns). For discussion of other skeptical
independent analysts, see id. at 77-79.
61. See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM.
ECON. REv. 465, 465-78 (1990) (discussing how group psychology may affect investment
decisions by fund managers); Jeffrey Zweibel, Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compen-
sation, 103 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1-4 (1995) (same).
62. See Scharfstein & Stein, supra note 61, at 466 (explaining managers' concern about
their reputations as one reason for herd behavior).
63. See id. (noting that "an unprofitable decision is not as bad for reputation when others
make the same mistake").
64. SENATE CoMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 115.
65. Id. at 108.
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The reasons for this failure are less clear than in the cases of the auditor
and the analysts, which involve severe conflicts of interest. In contrast,
conflicts do not appear to have compromised the activities of the rating
agencies. It is true that they are compensated for their ratings by the compa-
nies they evaluate. However, a range of federal and state regulations effec-
tively require corporations to obtain ratings from these agencies, and the
agencies do not appear to compete among themselves for this business. There
is, in other words, no obvious financial incentive for grade inflation.
However, the essentially fixed demand for their services and the cozy,
oligopolistic market structure in which they operate may have bred adverse
consequences of a different kind. The rating agencies' abiding faith in
Enron's creditworthiness may have been due to complacency rather than
conflict of interest.66 It appears that review of Enron's public filings was
superficial. Even though this is the agencies' primary source of information,
their evaluation did not include follow-up questioning on undecipherable
items such as the opaque related-party disclosures included in Enron's Form
10-K filing for 2000.6' The agencies instead seem to have focused their
attention on readily ascertainable factors, like Enron's current cash position,
rather than undertaking more searching-and more arduous-analysis of
Enron's actual financial condition and its longer-term prospects.6" Even
though the agencies have privileged access to inside information, 69 at least as
to Enron they seem to have been content simply to accept management
statements at face value, rather than attempting to probe more deeply.7"
The credit rating agencies' complacency may stem from their belief that
they could not be held accountable for their work by those who rely on it.
Courts have held that the First Amendment protects credit ratings.7 Whether
they are subject to SEC regulation under the Investment Advisers Act of
66. This is essentially the conclusion of the Staff of the Senate Committee on Governmen-
tal Affairs. Id. at 116-25.
67. Id. at 116.
68. Id. at 117-18.
69. The rating agencies are not subject to Regulation FD, which restricts companies'
ability to make selective disclosure of material, non-public information.
70. SENATE COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 118-19.
71. See, e.g., Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Moody's Investor's Servs., 175 F.3d 848,
855-57 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying actual knowledge or reckless disregard standard to a claim
based on a credit rating); County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 156 n.4 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) ('Standard & Poor's ratings are speech and, absent special circumstances, are
protected by the First Amendment.").
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194072 is unclear at best,73 and, in any event, the Commission has never
undertaken an enforcement action against them based on their ratings.
V Implications of Gatekeeper Failure
A. The Relevance of Causing Liability
1. Substantive Scope
The gatekeepers discussed above seem to be good candidates for "caus-
ing" liability. The statutes refer simply to anyone who "is, was or would be
a cause" of someone else's violation "due to an act or omission that the person
knew or should have known would contribute to such violation. 7 4 It seems
quite plausible to argue that Andersen contributed to Enron's fraud on inves-
tors by issuing unqualified audit reports. Similarly, the analysts' steadfast
support enabled Enron to stay afloat longer than it should have, as did the
rating agencies' blind commitment to investment grade assessments right up
until the eve of bankruptcy.
On its face, the statutory language is quite broad. "Contribute" can be
defined to mean "assist" or "facilitate" or simply "enable." The statutes make
no reference to the degree or quantum of assistance. This contrasts with the
"substantial assistance" element that courts have applied in aiding and abetting
actions.
75
As Van Hoey explains, the SEC has only recently begun to attempt to
make sense of this neglected language.76 Not surprisingly, the Commission
has taken a broad interpretive approach. In the KPMG77 case, it held that a
person may be liable for causing another's violation through negligence. 8
Rejection of a scienter requirement effectively recognizes causing to be a
72. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2000).
73. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181,203-11(1985) (concluding that the term "investment
adviser" does not include those who do not provide advice directly to clients).
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1 (a), 78u-3(a), 80a-9(f)(1), 80b-3(kXl) (2000).
75. -See Van Hoey, supra note 1, at 257 (examining the degree of assistance required to
establish aiding and abetting).
76. Id. at251.
77. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 74 SEC Docket 384 (Jan. 19, 2001), aff'd sub nom.
KPMQ, LLP v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
78. ' Id. at 421. KPMG involved an action brought by the SEC against an auditor for
negligently causing an audit client to violate Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act. Id. at 385-86.
Because the auditor was not independent, it contributed to the client's primary violation when
it assisted the client's filing of financial statements with the SEC that had not been audited by
an independent firm. Id. at 419.
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basis for secondary liability as distinct from aiding and abetting.79 The
distinction is potentially important for causing actions brought against gate-
keepers, who cannot assert their lack of knowing or reckless assistance as a
defense.
In the same case, the SEC considered the degree of likelihood of future
violation necessary for a cease-and-desist order and concluded that the risk
"need not be very great."' 0 In fact, absent evidence to the contrary, proof of
a violation itself satisfies the requirement."1 As Van Hoey points out, it is
hard to imagine what kind of evidence might be deemed sufficient to rebut the
presumption in the SEC's favor.8 2 Again, this interpretation eases the SEC's
burden in causing actions brought against gatekeepers.
As Van Hoey carefully articulates, causing liability presents difficult and
as yet unresolved questions regarding causation. 3 Specifically, should but-for
or cause-in-fact causation be sufficient or, instead, must the defendant's act
be a more direct or immediate cause of the primary violator's wrongdoing?
Van Hoey argues for a proximate cause standard, which would have the effect
of narrowing the scope of causing liability. 4 It would also open up a hornets'
nest of unpredictability, though real certainty regarding causation rules may
be impossible to come by in any event.85
Cases involving nonfeasance-as opposed to active participation in
another's wrongdoing-can present especially difficult causation questions.
If, for example, a corporate director had performed her responsibilities (in-
stead of doing nothing), would it really have made a difference?-was her
failure a cause of insiders' fraud against the corporation?86 Application of
even a low causation standard is problematic in a case like that, especially if
the director's duty under the circumstances is simply to object and then resign
if the thefts do not stop.87 A tougher proximate cause requirement would
79. Van Hoey, supra note 1, at 288.
80. KPMG, 74 SEC Docket at 430.
81. Id.
82. Van Hoey, supra note 1, at 282-83.
83. Id. at 301-06.
84. Id. at 307.
85. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)
("There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement,
or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion.").
86. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 817-20 (N.J. 1981) (involving
completely inattentive director who did nothing to prevent insiders' fraud against corporation).
87. See id. at 826-27 (discussing what a director should have done if she had discovered
the fraud).
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depend on even more elaborate speculation about what might have happened
and therefore would render a finding of liability even less likely.
Even if we assume that the failures of Enron's gatekeepers were sins of
omission-of nonfeasance-rather than of active assistance,8 the causation
problem seems less perplexing. In fact, the choice between standards may not
be terribly important. It is hard to imagine that a qualified audit report, or a
rash of "sell" recommendations, or a significant downgrading of Enron's
creditworthiness would not have led to stricter scrutiny of Enron's finances
and business operations by investors and by the SEC. If the gatekeepers had
done their work properly, it seems quite likely that Enron would not have
flown as high as it did and would have experienced a much swifter return to
earth. Even under a stricter proximate cause standard, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the gatekeepers' failures contributed significantly to Enron's
ability to get away with its fraudulent activities for as long as it did.
2. Remedy
The remedy available to the SEC in a case brought against someone for
causing another to violate the securities laws is a cease-and-desist order issued
by an administrative law judge. The order requires the person who caused the
violation "to cease and desist from committing or causing such violation and
any future violation of the same provision, rule, or regulation." 9 This is not
a trivial matter, because violation of the order can be the basis for civil mone-
tary penalties or contempt sanctions. The order can also mandate disgorge-
ment in appropriate cases.'
This remedy is among the mildest weapons in the SEC's arsenal.9" Even
if it were possible to use causing liability to reach Enron's gatekeepers, one
still must ask whether the sanction is harsh enough to deter future wrongdoing
ex ante. Under one theory, the gatekeeper failures in Enron and other recent
cases were due to under-deterrence.92 In this regard, the Supreme Court's
88. Recall, however, that Andersen was actively involved in the structure of at least some
of Enron's shady dealings. Even under a proximate cause standard, these acts should be
sufficient to establish liability if Andersen's involvement was substantial.
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-l(a), 78u-3(a), 80a-9(f)(1), 80b-3(kXl) (2000).
90. Id. §§ 77h-1(e), 78u-3(e), 80a-9(f)(5), 80b-3(kX5) (2000).
91. Van Hoey shows how a cease-and-desist order is weaker than the remedies available
in aiding and abetting actions, the other basis for secondary liability. Van Hocey, supra note 1,
at 277-80.
92. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1409-10 ("The general deterrence story focuses on the
decline in the expected liability costs arising out of acquiescence by auditors in aggressive
accounting policies favored by managements.").
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 309 (2003)
elimination of private aiding and abetting actions was especially significant,93
but Congress has also played a role.94 Given the conflicts of interest built into
the system, the monetary rewards of complacency, and the apparent decline
in the reputational costs of exposure, it is hard to feel confident that even
robust use of causing liability could significantly alter gatekeeper behavior.
B. Recent Developments
Recent developments may play a more direct role in improving gate-
keeper performance than the threat of causing liability. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002"s includes a hodgepodge of reforms, a number of them directed
at the gatekeepers. The statute establishes a new independent board to over-
see the accounting profession, which until now has been almost entirely self-
governing.96 It also undertakes to regulate conflicts of interest between audit
work and consulting activities.' The statute further mandates safeguards
designed to separate research and investment banking activities and to en-
hance analyst independence' and requires the SEC or the exchanges to
develop new rules governing disclosure of information that may indicate
conflict of interest.99 (Meanwhile, recently adopted NYSE/NASD rules
address analysts' conflicts of interest,"° and a settlement between ten of the
largest securities firms and the State of New York requires that the firms
provide research for individual investors independently of the firms' invest-
ment banking activities. 101) Sarbanes-Oxley also requires the SEC to under-
93. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 170-92
(1994) (holding that neither the antifraud statute nor the legislative scheme authorized private
actions for aiding and abetting).
94. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 16,
112 Stat. 3227, 3227-33 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000)) (abolishing state
court class actions for securities fraud); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-67, §§ 27(aX2XA), 27A(), 2 01(gX2), 109 Stat. 737, 738, 750, 758 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 77z-2, 78u-4 (2000)) (including raised pleading standards, substitution of
proportionate liability for joint and several liability, and restrictions on scope of RICO).
95. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 746 (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66).
96. Id. §§ 101-109,116 Stat. at 750-71.
97. Id. §§ 201-209, 116 Sta. at 771-75.
98. Id. § 501, 116 Stat. at 791-93.
99. Id.
100. For a summary of these rules, see SENATE CoMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at
90-91.
101. Smith, supra note 21, at Cl. The settlement also includes over $1.4 billion in
penalties and other assessments. Id. Additionally, it requires that the firms undertake to end
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take a study of the credit rating agencies.' 0 2 Finally, recognizing the SEC's
role as a gatekeeper, the statute mandates significant budget increases.'0 3
Together, all of these reforms are designed to improve the gatekeepers'
performance and restore public confidence in their work. Whether they will
have anything more than a symbolic effect remains to be seen."04 Further,
Sarbanes-Oxley does not itself provide for gatekeeper liability. Therefore,
even if elements of the statute prove to be important, causing liability could
still have a role to play in policing gatekeeper activities.
Of potentially greater importance is Judge Harmon's ruling in December
2002 in the Houston Enron case.' Based on their alleged "substantial
participation" in the preparation of false statements about Enron's financial
condition, this decision allows private actions to proceed against Arthur
Andersen, Vinson & Elkins, and several major financial institutions as pri-
mary violators of Securities Exchange Act Rule I Ob-5. These firms therefore
face the prospect of massive money damages liability to Enron's shareholders
due to their involvement in Enron's fraudulent activities. The ruling is
important because private actions cannot be based on aiding and abetting
alone.'0 6 At least as to auditors, law firms, and investment banks and other
financial institutions, this decision should pose a far more serious threat than
causing liability and its milder sanctions. Whether Judge Harmon's ruling
will survive appellate review remains to be seen, as do the implications (if
any) for the liability of securities analysts and credit rating agencies.
VI. Conclusion
The manifest gatekeeper failures that contributed to the Enron disaster
provide a case study for how causing liability might apply to the recent raft
of accounting scandals. It is less clear, however, whether the relatively mild
allocation of IPO shares to corporate executives in order to generate investment banking
business. Id.
102. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 702, 116 Stat. 746, 797-98.
103. Id. § 601, 116 Stat. at 793-94.
104. For a skeptical assessment, see Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses
to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,28 J. CoRP. L. 1 (2002).
105. See Kurt Eichenwald, Ruling Leaves Most Players Exposed to Suits on Enron:
Disgruntled Investors May Have Many Targets, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 2002, at B3 (explaining
Judge Harmon's ruling in In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F.
Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002)).
106. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191
(1994) (holding that neither the antifraud statute nor the legislative scheme authorized private
actions for aiding and abetting).
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sanctions associated with this form of liability are potent enough to deter
future gatekeepers from neglect of their public responsibilities in similar
circumstances. Furthermore, post-Enron legislative and judicial develop-
ments may address the problem of gatekeeper failure more directly. New
regulatory structures, legal restrictions, and the threat of liability as primary
violators may stand a greater chance of enhancing gatekeeper performance
and may therefore have a greater role to play in the restoration of investor
confidence. Even so, Gregory Van Hoey has done an admirable service in
shedding light on this neglected enforcement tool and its potential value for
the pursuit of secondary violators of the securities laws. It remains to be seen
what the SEC will make of it and what the effects of such initiatives might be.
